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Abstract
A rocket engine safety system is designed to initiate control procedures which will minimize
damage to the engine and vehicle or test stand in the event of an engine failure. This l_ort describes
the features and the implementation issues associated with rocket engine safety systems. Specific
concerns of safety systems applied to a space-based engine and long duration space missions are dis-
cussed. Examples of safety system features and architectures are given from recent safety monitoring
investigations conducted for the Space Shuttle Main Engine and for future liquid rocket engines. Also,
a general design and implementation process for rocket engine safety systems is presented.
Introduction
The goal of every rocket engine design is to satisfy the mission performance requirements,
while at the same time ensuring the safety of the engine and the vehicle or facility test stand. Due
to the time, cost, and potential risks to human life involved in rocket engine operation, many
investigationsarecurrentlyunderway toimprovethe currentstateofrocketenginesafetymonitoring.
The rocket engine safety system should perform real-time, on-line detection and, when appropriate and
possible, identification of failure modes, especially those that may lead to loss of crew, vehicle or
mission. This paper outlines the features of safety systems and discusses the issues involved in their
implementation.
This paper describes the current Space Shuttle Main Engine (SSME) safety system and recent
activities in the area of advanced safety algorithms for the SSME. In addition, the safety system
concepts proposed for future rocket engines are discussed. The impact of mission requirements and
hardware limitations on safety systems are presented. Also discussed are the various implementation
issues that must be addressed during the safety system design phase. Issues associated primarily
with space engine applications of safety systems are discussed and a general safety system design
process is proposed.
Background
Safety systems have been used throughout the history of rocket engine development. The
systems implemented to date are based entirely on limit-checking algorithms; failure detection is
achieved by comparing the sensor data to predetermined limits. Safety systems, currently in use, do
limit_hocking upon individual sensor signals. The SSME controlier, for example, monitors six
parameters during steady-state operation; four of the six are compared to absolute limits, while the
fiRh and sixth parameters are compared to limits that are a function of the operating state. If any
of these limits is exceeded for three consecutive sampling intorvak (a sampling interval is 20
milliseconds), a shutdown sequence is initiated.' In addition, start confirm criteria are applied to
several parameters during startup to ensure that ignition has occurred.
One augmentation to the SSME safety system described above has been the Flight
Acce]erometer Safety Cutoff System (FASCOS). This system monitors the output from six
accelerometers, three on each high pressure turbopump. FASCOS has been installed in ground test
firings andflights;however, physical connection to the main engine controller has never been made
for flight due to a series of problems with faulty accelerometers. I
Other efforts are currently underway to improve SSME safety system performance. _1° Each
effort provides the safety system with additional information about the current operation ofthe e_gine
based on a selected sensor set. Although the techniques have been developed for the SSME, they could
be readily applied to other rocket engines. All of these techniques are intended for r,ml-time
implementation.
The System for Anomaly and Failure Detection (SAFD) examines the time average of incoming
sensor signals in order to filter out noise. W The filtering process allows limits which are tighter and
more refined than for unfiltered signals. The data is averaged over a 200-millisecond window. This
window size was chosen to permit the detection of rapidly occurring failures as well as failure modes
that occur over long periods of time. SAFD analyzes a set of twenty-four parameters and indicates
an anomaly when a predetermined number of sensors simultaneously exceed their limits.
Time series analysis was applied to SSME test stand data in two studies. Is Both studies
developed univariate time series (autoregressive) models and analyzed the residual information, actual
sensor deviations from the models, to detect failure modes. The first study applied the autoregressive
technique to nine parameters, while the latter study computed time series models for eighteen
parameters. Although successful in detecting some failures, the time series technique requires the
signal to be stationary over the entire period of engine operation to which it is being applied. SSME
processes such as tank venting and repressurization, which occur during most steady power-level
operations, cause non-stationary behavior. Therefore, the time series technique has limited
applicability. The first study also investigated a detection technique that computed the average power
of the signal with time. The Average Signal Power (ASP) technique was applied to eighteen SSME
parameters. The technique requires the signal to be stationary only during each average signai
computation window. A 2-second computation window was used to minimize the impact of non-
stationary behavior.
Several studies investigated the combination ofvarious sensors in order to detect SSME failure
modes. 7"t Each study compared test stand data to nominal exemplar data sets developed from the
SSM:E steady-state model or nominal test firings. The comparison resulted in a residual for each
sensor. One approach involved a linear summation of the residuals; a failure was detected when the
residual sum exceeded a predetermined nominal limit: J In another approach, the residual set at each
time Mice was correlated with an expected or nominal residual set; fault detection was based on the
value of the correlation coefllcient. _.s
The previous techniques were developed for use during steady-state operation of the SSME.
Several techniques have been applied to non-steady-state operation on the SSME. One investigation
involved the application of non-linear regression models to the startup and shutdown transients. _
Neural network models have been developed for several parameters during startup, z° In beth cases,
the deviations between the actual and model-predicted values are intended to be used as indicators
of engine and/or sensor health. The use of SSME fleet-wide nominal performance envelopes during
the various transient conditions has also been proposed:
Figures la and lb show the same typical SSME thrust profde. Figure la illustrates the
current coverage of the SSME safety system, while Figure lb illustrates the proposed coverage of the
techniques described above. A larger number of sensors are employed for fault detection by the safety
system described in Figure lb. As can be seen, a collection of algorithms will be required in order to
provide comprehensive coverage of the engine.
Several factors are involved in evaluating the performance of the safety system. These include
the number of anomalies detected, the number of missed detections, and the number of false alarms.
In addition,the detectiontimebuffer is extremely important. The detection time buffer is the time
period between the detection of the failure mode and the time when the engine control cannot prevent
significant damage to the engine or its surroundings. When applying an advanced safety algorithm
to historical SSM]_ failure data, the time buffer is defmed as the time between detection of the failure
mode by the safety algorithm and the time when the redline system initiated shutdown. Figure 2
illustrates the actual chamber pressure profile for SSME test fwing 901-864. For this example, the
time buffer is shown to be the difference between the SAFD detection time and the actual redline
engine cutoff. This engine sustained significant damage which could have been reduced by an earlier
shutdown.
Table 1 presents the results of applying several steady-state fault detection algorithms to five
anomalous SSME ground test fwings. Although the detection techniques were developed in these
studies, the detection criteria need to be refined. Therefore, direct comparisons ofthe detection times
between the various algorithms are inappropriate. The results do show that each algorithm provides
improved detection times over the existing redline system; earlier detection times indicate larger time
buffers. The algorithms take advantage of early failure indications in the data and hence permit
earlier shutdown than the current redline system.
Space Engine Safety System Features
Rocket engine safety systems can exhibit a wide range of features which are dependent upon
mission and engine requirements. Space engines are designed to perform in a space environment for
long durations. Mission profiles require the space engine to be highly reliable (man-rated) and
reusable, and perform during various mission phases such as orbit transfer and lander missions, u The
safety system must have the flexibility to accommodate the multiple mission profiles anticipated for
a space engine and to allow for changes during the development and production phases of the engine
program. The design and operation of the safety system must also reflect the control capabilities of
the rocket engine.
The primary requirement for any safety monitoring system is that it must perform in real
time; the system must be able to collect, analyze and interpret sensor information. The safety system
must take advantage of precursor failure indications in the data in order to minimize engine and
vehicle damage and mission impact. As a minimum, the safety system should detect incipient failures
early enough to give the controller sufficient time to shutdown the engine safely. Determination of
"sufficient time" is based on either experience or on detailed knowledge of the failure mode, its rate
of propagation and its effects. In cases where such knowledge is not available, system response to the
failure mode should be initiated at the time of earliest detection.
The ability ofthe safety system to provide these functions will depend upon the failure modes
of the particular engine cycle as well as the type and location of sensors. Some failure modes
propagate quickly, such as turbine blade cracking and duct rupture. These failures give little or no
early failure indications in traditional performance sensors (temperatures, pressures, etc.) and may
not be manageable without specialized sensors. Sensors can be divided into two classes: those that
sense the primary effects of an anomalous condition and those that inferentially determine component
conditions based upon secondary effects, n A bearing deflectometer is an example of the former; this
sensor determines bearing wear by measuring the localized, cyclic deformations c_ the outer bearing
race caused by the passage of the balls, n Alternatively, information from several inferential sensors
can be fused and processed to provide fault detection capability. For example, bearing wear san result
in turbopump performance degradation and can lead to changes in inlet and discharge pressures and
temperatures, changes in fluid flowrate and/or changes in shaft speed. The difficulty in using
inferential sensors for fault isolation arises in correlating a unique set of sensor responses to a
particular failure mode. (_ritical failures which provide sufficient early failure indications in the
available sensor suite should be the ones targeted by the safety system.
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Additionalfeaturesofasafetysystemaredesirableto ensure mission success and to improve
the operation of the safety system. Mission success may differ From engine safety in that the
immediate shutdown of the engine may not be a preferred option given a particular mission profile.
For example identification of the detected failure mode and its effects may indicato that the engine
can operate safely at a reduced power level; this control option will allow more flexibility in the
selection ofengine command procedures based upon mission requirements. Features, such as sensor
validation, fault accommodating control and automated diagnostics/prognostics will improve safety
system performance by increasing the probability of mission su_ese.
The space engine safetysystem should have the ability to validate sensor signals and to
accommodate failed sensor measurements. On the SSME, sensors fail at a much higher rate than any
other component. Several ground test firings have been shutdown erroneously due to failed
measurements. In addition, an in-flight redlined temperature sensor Failure caused an 8SME to
erroneously cut_fl" on flight STS-51F." Sensor failures are either "hard failures" where the sensor
completely discontinues functioning properly Or "soft failures" where the sensor discrepancy is more
difl%ult to ascertain, such as thermal drift. Sensor validation functions may include limit checks,
built.in tests, voting logic for redundant sensors (three or more), and analytical redundancy techniques
which provide a synthesized signal for comparison with an actual signal. Once sensor failures have
been detected and isolated, they must be ignored by the fault detection algorithms to prevent false
alarms. In some cases, it may be advantageous to use synthesized measurements for engine control
or engine health assessment. The use of analytical redundancy for sensor fault detection, isolation
and accommodation has been successfully demonstrated on aircraft engines." Analytical redundancy
techniques are currently being investigated for the SSME? e The availability of synthesized signals
will be critical for space-based engine safety systems since some space-based engine studies have
identified the entire engine as an Orbital Replaceable Unit, _. therefore, individual sensors cannot be
replaced.
The number and complexity of the functions that the safety system must support establish the
computational requirements and therefore drive the hardware design. Throughput analysis assesses
the processing and I/O requirements for these functions and provides an initial estimate of the
hardware required. Each detection algorithm will have a specific set of computational requirements.
Some detection algorithms may analyze the frequency information of the sensor signal and therefore
require high sampling rates. Other algorithms may be designed specifically for sensors that supply
large amounts of information, such as a spectrometer or optical pyrometer. The architecture must be
designed to accommodate these throughput requirements. Furthermore, the architecture should be
flexible to facilitate the evolution ofthe safety system as new sensors or fault detection and/or isolation
techniques become available or mission requirements are altered.
One possible area of future evolution involves the use of real-time diagnostics for the purpose
of fault accommodating control. Histor/cally, rocket engine safety systems have been primarily used
to initiate shutdown in the event of an engine anomaly. Fault accommodating control allows the
safety system to respond based on engine health; an example is sensor fault accommodation. The
reduction of mission risk is a primary driver in the development of fault accommodating control
capabilities. 's In addition, an advanced safety system could assess the probable risks associated with
various control strategies in response to engine component degradations. For example, a possible
response to an engine degradation would be to throttle back the engine to operate at a reduced power.
Fault accommodating control requires real-time diagnostic and prognostic capabilities and will
therefore be computational]y intensive.
The f'ma] feature of the safety system for space-based engines involves its interaction with
other systems, such as the engine controlier and the vehicle or test stand. The controller can provide
the safety system with the current engine operating point and the control process that is maintaining
that point; the engine safety system supplies the controlier with the current health of the engine and
required action in the event of an anomaly. The engine safety system must also communicate
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appropriateinformationto thevehicleso that mission and vehicle impacts can be assessed in addition
to engine considerations. In a multi-engine conf'_tration,/'or example, the vehicle safety system must
perform all functions that require data from more than one engine. Thrust vectoring is an example
of such a function. In all cases, the vehicle safety system and the crew must have the authority to
override the commands from the engine safety system.
Space Engine Safety System Design and Implementation Issues
The design of the safety system is strongly influenced by the engine design and mission
requirements. This section proposes a rocket engine safety system design process that satisfies the
features and requirements described in the previous section. The proposed methedology assumes that
the safety and engine system designs are highly interactive and that they are conducted concurrently.
Initially a Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is performed on the current en4_ne
design to identify potential failure modes and the probable effects of the modes. The failure modes
are then prioritized based on mission impact and probability of occurrence. A sensor set is selected
to allow detection and possible identification of the prioritized failure modes. The sensor set is then
introduced back into the engine design where implementation issues, such as any effects on engine
operation and engine structural integrity due to sensor placement, are addressed. Several iterations
may be required in order to achieve an acceptable sensor set for both the engine and the safety system.
For example, an optimization procedure used by the Rocket Engine Condition Monitoring System
(RECMS) program for the National Launch System, was based on life cycle cost. tt
Once the optimum sensor set is selected, analytical tools must be chosen to process the sensor
data and to detect the prioritized failure modes. These tools may be selected from previous safety
system applications or they may require development due to new sensor technologies or unique
requirements. The refinement ofthe detection tools to the particular engine may be achieved through
engine models and component test rigs, until the engine development is complete.
Based on the detection capabilities and the controllability of the engine system, the safety
system designer determines the extent of the diagnostic and prognostic capability required of the
safety system. Results from the FMEAs and Failure Information Propagation Models, expert
knowledge and qualitative models will generate the diagnostic tools needed to isolate and identify the
failure process occurring. The prognostic tools will supply the system with the propagation of the
failure mode with time, including limited component life prediction. Also, available control strategies,
such as reduction in thrust or change in mixture ratio, are developed in response to anomalous engine
conditions. During operation, the safety system will supply the proper control action based on the
identified failure mode, the prognosis for that mode and the current mission requirements.
After the analytical tools t'or the safety system are de/'med, the system framework or
architecture can be devised. The architecture must optimize mass, throughput and reliability. The
architecture must also allow for modifications of the safety system due to char_es in the engine or the
safety system algorithmic tools, and for the verification and validation (V&V) of the safety system.
Several architectures for a real-time monitoring and control system t'or rocket engines have been
considered. 17 The two main categories of architectures are centralized and de-centralized. In the
centralized system, all of the algorithmic tools are dynamically allocated on multi-processor boards in
order to utilize computer resources efficiently and minimize response time. The de_ontralised system
features the organization of the tools onto discrete processors or sots of processors by some criteria.
Algorithmic tool functionality and engine component breakdown are two decentralized system
architectures; other de_entralizod architectures might include, algorithmic tools that utilize common
signal inputs or are scheduled to be applied during the same mission phase. Centralized system
architectures require less hardware, while offering maximized utilization of all resources. De-
centralization of'the system architecture will allow for the greatest ease in modifying the safety system
and in performing a thorough application of V&V techniques.
V&V must be an important considerationin the developmentof the safety system. The
software framework must allow for V&V hooks, so that each algorithm van be checked out
independently. Finally the tots] safety system package, both hardware and software must be tested
to ensure that all componente interact properly and efficiently. The testing process for the ufety
system should be thorough in order to provide reliable safety system operation.
Concluding Remarks
This paper presented the issues involved in the development of a space engine safety system.
A space engine safety system must be able to supply reliable, real-time protection to the engine and
vehicle or facility test stand. Experience with the SSME indicates that a collection of algorithms is
required in order to provide complete and comprehensive coverage of the engine. The u_'ety syltem
features are dependent on the anticipated mission profiles and the design and controllability of the
engine. The engine design establishes the failure modes, while the engine controllability and mission
profiles will define the real-time r_ponses available to the safety system. The failure modes and the
available responses may suggest the need for fault accommodating control, which will in turn require
real-time diagnostic and prognostic capabilities.
The safety system design process presented emphasizes that the safety system should be
designed concurrently with the engine. The selection of sensors and algorithmic tools, and the system
framework are heavily influenced by the engine design. At the same time, the engine design and
performance are effected by selection of the 5en_or suite and their locations. The safety system
framework should be selected based on throughput and reliability considerations, as well as cue in
V&V and overall syBtem modification and expansion. Thorough evaluation of the safety system
features presented in this paper, with the mission and engine requirement8 and proper system design
will provide a safety system that enhances engine safety and reliability.
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SSME SAFD
Test
Firing Ref.5
901-307
901-340
901-364
901-436
902-249
19.8
205.7
Time Series
Ref. Ref.
6 7
9.0
291.0 12.2
154.0 210.0
369.0 70.0
398.0 160.0
, |
ASP Linear Sum
Ref. 6 Ref. Ref.
43.5 15.6
21.0 279.2
387.0 45.2
48.0 325.9
398.0 329.6 158.8
Correlation Redline
Cutoff
Ref. Ref. Ref. 3
7 8
8.6 16.6 76.0
405.6 290"2 405.5
42.7 38.0 392"2
302.4 141.0 611.1
5.2 20.9 450.6
Table 1. Available detection times by proposed steady-stato detection techniques
on five catastrophic SSME test firings.
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